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A SYNOPSIS OF THE 1979 AMENDMENTS TO
THE FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE
I.

INTRODUCTION

On April 30, 1979, the Supreme Court of the United States ordered
the amendment of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 1 The
modifications ordered by the Court promise to bring about significant
changes in the Rules,' clarify ambiguous sections,3 eliminate confusion
in application," and bring the Rules into conformity with recent case
law. I
The process of amending the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
began with the Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules of the Judicial
Conference of the United States. The Advisory Committee was responsible for drafting the text of the proposed amendments and submitting
explanatory comments.6 The proposed changes and additions were
then sent to the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the
Judicial Conference,' which solicited comments from the bench and
bar before submitting the amendments to the Judicial Conference. 8
Subsequently, the Judicial Conference approved the proposed amend1. Order Amending the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 441 U.S. 989
(1979). The Supreme Court ordered the amendment of rules 6(e), 7(c)(2), 9(a),
ll(e)(2), ll(e)(6), 17(h), 18, 32(c)(3)(E), 32(0, 35, 40, 41(a), (b), and (c), and 44(c).
Additionally, two new rules were proposed: 26.2 and 32.1.
2. The original Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure were transmitted to Congress
by the Attorney General of the United States, on January 3, 1945. Advisory Committee Notes were recommended shortly thereafter. The Rules were enacted to govern the
procedure in all criminal proceedings in the United States District Courts, the United
States Courts of Appeals, and the United States Supreme Court. FED. R. CRIM. P. 54.
3. See, e.g., notes 45-67 and accompanying text infra for the clarification of FED.
R. CRIM. P. 11 (1979).
4. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 40 (1979), Notes of the Advisory Committee on

Rules.
5. See, e.g., notes 100-152 and accompanying text infra for a discussion of the
enactment of FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.1 (1979).
6. See U.S.C.A., pamphlet no. 2 (Sept. 1979) for the text and comments of the
amendments which are already in effect. The text and comments of the amendments
which have been delayed by Congress can be found in West's Federal Rules 1979.
7. The Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure did not publish any written
materials on these amendments.
8. The Judicial Conference of the United States, created pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
331 (1976), carries on a continuous study of the general rules of practice and procedure
used in courts of the United States. The Conference recommends necessary changes to
the Supreme Court. Id.
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ments and transmitted them to the Supreme Court.' The Supreme
Court then ordered these amendments to take effect on August 1,
1979.10

Upon receipt by Congress, the amendments to the Rules were
referred to the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice. Currently
engaged in a major effort to overhaul the Federal Criminal Code, the
Subcommittee was unable to study the proposed changes in detail.
Consequently, the Subcommittee acted to delay the passage of those
amendments that it regarded as particularly controversial or farreaching." l Accordingly, Congress delayed the effective dates of the
modifications to rules 11(e)(6), 17(h), 32(f), and 44(c) and the enactment of rules 26.2 and 32.1 until a study of the changes could be
made, or until December 1, 1980, whichever comes first. 2
This comment will analyze the changes made in the Federal Rules,
particularly noting the rationale for the various amendments and the
intended effects of those changes.
II.
A.

ANALYSIS

Amendment to Rule 6(e): Grand Jury Secrecy

The amendment to rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure mandates the recording of all federal grand jury proceedings. 3
9.
STATES

REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED

(Sept. 21-22, 1978).

10. The order, which authorized the amendment of 12 of the procedural rules and
the addition of 2 new rules, was made pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 3771-72 (1976). Section 3771 empowers the Supreme Court to prescribe the rules of pleading, practice,
and procedure for criminal proceedings, prior to and including the verdict, in United
States District Courts. This section further states that the rules of pleading, practice,
and procedure shall not take effect until the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
reports the rules to Congress. Section 3772 empowers the Supreme Court to prescribe
the rules of practice and procedure with respect to proceedings after the verdict. The
Supreme Court is authorized under this section to fix the dates when the rules are to
take effect.
11. See H.R. 4712, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
12. Id.
13. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e) (1979). Rule 6(e) reads:
Recording and Disclosure of Proceedings.
(1) Recording of Proceedings.-All proceedings, except when the grand jury is
deliberating or voting, shall be recorded stenographically or by an electronic
recording device. An unintentional failure of any recording to reproduce all or
any portion of a proceeding shall not affect the validity of the prosecution. The
recording or reporter's notes or any transcript prepared therefrom shall remain in
the custody or control of the attorney for the government unless otherwise
ordered by the court in a particular case.
(2) General Rule of Secrecy.-A grand juror, an interpreter, a stenographer, an
operator of a recording device, a typist who transcribes recorded testimony, an attorney for the government, or any person to whom disclosure is made under
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Formerly held to be permissive," the new recordation requirement exempts only those portions of the grand jury proceedings when the
jurors are deliberating or voting." In effect, the amendment to this
rule codifies changes that many commentators and courts have long
advocated.16 Additionally, many have felt these changes to be
necessary prerequisites to the safeguarding of defendants' rights and
the prevention of possible prosecutorial abuse."
paragraph (3) (A) (ii) of this subdivision shall not disclose matters occurring
before the grand jury, except as otherwise provided for in these rules. No obligation of secrecy may be imposed on any person except in accordance with this rule.
A knowing violation of rule 6 may be punished as a contempt of court.
(3) Exceptions.
(A) Disclosure otherwise prohibited by this rule of matters occurring
before the grand jury, other than its deliberations and the vote of any
grand juror, may be made to(i) an attorney for the government for use in the performance
of such attorney's duty; and
(ii) such government personnel as are deemed necessary by an attorney for the government to assist an attorney for the government in
performance of such attorney's duty to enforce federal criminal
law.
(B) Any person to whom matters are disclosed under subparagraph (A)
(ii) of this paragraph shall not utilize that grand jury material for any
purpose other than assisting the attorney for the government in the performance of such attorney's duty to enforce federal criminal law. An attorney for the government shall promptly provide the district court, before
which was impaneled the grand jury whose material has been so disclosed,
with the names of the persons to whom such disclosure has been made.
(C) Disclosure otherwise prohibited by this rule of matters occurring before the grand jury may also be made(i) when so directed by a court preliminary to or in connection with
a judicial proceeding; or
(ii) when permitted by a court at the request of the defendant, upon
a showing that grounds may exist for a motion to dismiss the indictment because of matters occurring before the grand jury.
If the court orders disclosure of matters occurring before the grand
jury, the disclosure shall be made in such manner, at such time, and
under such conditions as the court may direct.
(4) Sealed Indictments. The federal magistrate to whom an indictment is
returned may direct that the indictment be kept secret until the defendant is in
custody or has been released pending trial. Thereupon the clerk shall seal the indictment and no person shall disclose the return of the indictment except when
necessary for the issuance and execution of a warrant or summons.
14. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e) (1979), Notes of the Advisory Committee. See also
United States v. Aloisio, 440 F.2d 705 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 824 (1971).
15. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(l) (1979).
16. 8 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 6.02[2][d] (2d ed. 1965); 1 WRIGHT, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 103 (1969);

SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL RULES OF

PROCEDURE, 52 F.R.D. 90, 94-95 (1971). Cf. United States v. Aloisio, 440 F.2d 705
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 824 (1971).
17. SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL RULES OF PROCEDURE, 52 F.R.D. 90, 94-95
(1971). See also cases cited in United States v. Aloisio, 440 F.2d 705 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 824 (1971).
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As outlined in the Advisory Committee Notes to amended rule
6(e), there are several benefits to be derived from the new recording requirement. Of primary importance, the recording requirement ensures
that both a defendant and the prosecutor have the opportunity to impeach a witness on the basis of any prior inconsistent statements made
to the grand jury." Secondly, the recording requirement lends greater
assurance that the testimony received by the grand jury is
trustworthy.' 9 Additionally, the recordation of grand jury proceedings
is an effective means of restraining possible prosecutorial abuses."0
The first benefit derived from the amendment of rule 6(e), that
either party may impeach the testimony of an opponent's witness based
on that witness' prior statements to the grand jury, results from the
"growing realization that disclosure, rather than suppression, of relevant materials ordinarily promotes the proper administration of
criminal justice."'" This is particularly important from the viewpoint
of the defense. Before the amendment to this rule, a defendant was entitled to examine the grand jury testimony against him, but there was
no guarantee that there would, in fact, be a record, either stenographic
or electronic, of that testimony." With the change in the rule,
however, a defendant is at least assured that there is a record of the
grand jury proceedings. Further, a defendant is assured that there is a
possibility of access to testimony adduced before that normally
secretive body. 3 The prosecution is no longer given "exclusive access
to a storehouse of relevant fact." 2 ' Armed with a record of the proceeding before the grand jury, the resourceful attorney can now use
the mandated record to bring out possible inconsistencies in a damaging witness' testimony.
The trustworthiness of testimony given before the grand jury is a
second benefit to be derived from the amendment of rule 6(e). As
noted in a second circuit decision,
[t]he recording of testimony is in a very real sense a circumstantial
guaranty of trustworthiness. Without the restraint of being subject to
18. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e) (1979), Notes of the Advisory Committee.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855, 870 (1966).
22. Id. See also United States v. Aloisio, 440 F.2d 705 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 824 (1971).
23. FIED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(C)(ii) (1979) provides that a defendant's access to

grand jury testimony is to be determined by the court, at the court's discretion. See

United States v. Penrod, 609 F.2d 1092, 1097 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S.Ct.
1850 (1980).

24. Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855, 873 (1966).
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prosecution for perjury, a restraint which is wholly meaningless or
nonexistent if the testimony is unrecorded, a witness may make baseless
all resulting in the
accusations founded on hearsay or false accusations,
23
crime.
a
for
citizen
fellow
a
of
indictment
The recordation requirement, then, provides an incentive or impetus to
a grand jury witness to give testimony that is truthful. A witness who
knows that his statements are being transcribed or recorded might
think twice before giving inaccurate or deceitful testimony. 6
The recording requirement further acts as a restraint on possible
prosecutorial abuse of the grand jury system. In fact, recordation of
the proceedings is probably the most effective curb on such potential
abuse."7 The very nature of grand jury proceedings allows for a strong
bond or relationship to develop between the sixteen to twenty-three
federal grand jurors. Because no defense attorney is allowed in the
grand jury room, there is no counter balance to the tactics, approach,
or charisma utilized by the prosecutor. The grand jury does not have
two attorney's personalities to analyze or choose from, but only
one-the prosecutor. The rapport or dependency which can develop
between the prosecutor and the grand jurors "can easily be turned into
an instrument of influence on grand jury deliberations." 2 All this can
work to the great disadvantage of a defendant. The amendment to rule
6(e) can counteract the potential "dependency relationship"; a prosecutor interested in exploiting the relationship will not be so likely to
do so given the fact that a record of the proceedings is being kept.
Rather, the prosecutor, like the grand jury witnesses, will be inclined
to act and speak in a manner that would give no hint of a possible exploitation of the dependency relationship or other abuse.
B.

Amendment to Rule 7(c)(2): Indictment and Information;
Criminal Forfeiture
The amendment to rule 7(c)(2)"' is intended to clarify its meaning.

25. United States v. Cramer, 447 F.2d 210, 222 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 1024 (1972).
26. Id.
27. United States v. Gramolini, 301 F. Supp. 39, 41-42 (D.R.I. 1969).
28. Id. at 41. See also United States v. Cathey, 591 F.2d 268 (5th Cir. 1979) where
the court of appeals held that inflammatory remarks made by a government agent in
front of the grand jury justified dismissal of an indictment. (In Cathey the government's agent had told the grand jury that the defendant was "caught with his hand in
the cookie jar."); United States v. Polizzi, 500 F.2d 856 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1120 (1975).
29. FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(c)(2) (1979) reads as follows: "(2) Criminal Forfeiture. No
judgment of forfeiture may be entered in a criminal proceeding unless the indictment
or the information shall allege the extent of the interest or property subject to
forfeiture."
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The amended rule mandates that no judgment of forfeiture may be
entered in a criminal proceeding unless the indictment or information
spells out "the extent of the interest or property subject to
forfeiture." 3 0 Thus, where a defendant in a criminal proceeding stands
to lose property by virtue of a forfeiture statute,3 ' amended rule 7(c)(2)
provides him with notice at the earliest possible time in that
proceeding that a criminal conviction could well cause him to lose property as well as his freedom.
Subsection (c)(2) was added to rule 7 in 1972. The current amendment of this subsection removes any ambiguity as to when the indictment or information must allege the extent of the property or interest
subject to possible forfeiture. 32 The modification is in response to
some confusion as to the application of the 1972 version33 and does not
apply to separate in rem proceedings. 3 ' By amending rule 7(c)(2), the
Advisory Committee has brought the procedure for dealing with indictments and informations fully into conformance with the common
law notion of forfeiture, as a defendant is given notice, a trial, and a
special jury finding on the issues surrounding the forfeiture following a
conviction.33
C. Amendment to Rule 9(a): Warrant or Summons Upon Indictment
or Information
The amendment to rule 9(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure makes explicit the requirement that a warrant for a defendant
named in an information be issued only upon a showing that the information is supported by probable cause.3 6 The amended rule codifies
30. Id.
31. For an explanation and analysis of the development of forfeiture statutes in
this country see Note, 62 CORNELL L. REv. 768 (1977).
32. Compare the language in the 1972 version of 7(c)(2): "When an offense charged
may result in a criminal forfeiture . . . .", with the amended rule 7(c)(2): "No judgment of forfeiture may be entered . . . unless . . . . " (emphases added).
33. See United States v. Hall, 521 F.2d 406 (9th Cir. 1975).
34. FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(c)(2) (1979), Notes of the Advisory Committee.
35. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 31(e) and 32(b)(2) (1979).
36. FED. R. CRIM. P. 9(a) (1979) reads as follows:
Warrant or Summons upon Indictment or Information.
(a) Issuance. Upon the request of the attorney for the government the court
shall issue a warrant for each defendant named in an information supported by a
showing of probable cause under oath as is required by Rule 4 (a), or in an indictment. Upon the request of the attorney for the government a summons instead of
a warrant shall issue. If no request is made, the court may issue either a warrant or
a summons in its discretion. More than one warrant or summons may issue for the
same defendant. The clerk shall deliver the warrant or summons to the marshal or
other person authorized by law to execute or serve it. If a defendant fails to appear in response to the summons, a warrant shall issue. Id. (Italics indicate new
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changes which have generally been assumed to be the state of the law.
A prosecutor's statement that an information should be issued against
a particular defendant must now be supported by a showing of prob37
able cause; a prosecutor's statement, standing alone, is not sufficient.
The amendment to rule 9(a) does not affect the requirements for
obtaining a warrant based upon an indictment. Indeed, in Gerstein v.
Pugh"'the Supreme Court indicated that the rule that an informationbased warrant should issue only upon a judicial determination of probable cause does not disturb the prior rule that an "indictment, 'fair
upon its face,' and returned by a 'properly constituted grand jury,'
conclusively determines the existence of probable cause and requires issuance of an arrest warrant without further inquiry."'" The warrant
which is issued pursuant to an indictment is based upon the grand
jury's, and not the prosecutor's, determination of probable cause. 0
The amendment to the rule affects only those warrants or summonses
issued pursuant to an information.
A finding of probable cause is necessary to ensure that the Fourth
Amendment guarantee against unfounded invasions of liberty and
privacy are protected."' The amended version of rule 9(a) safeguards
those individual rights by demanding that probable cause be found in
an information-based warrant. The prosecution must now establish to
a court or magistrate that there is a "reasonable ground of suspicion,
supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man in the belief that the party is guilty of the offense
with which he is charged."4 " The requirement thus safeguards an individual from false or malicious accusations." 3 Fourth Amendment interests are protected, as the new standard represents a necessary accommodation between a suspect's right to liberty and the state's duty
to control crime."
material. Other stylistic changes not the subject of this analysis are not underlined.)
37. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
38. Id.
39. Id. at 117 n. 19 (citing Exparte United States, 287 U.S. 241, 250 (1932)).

40. See Giordinello v. United Staes, 357 U.S. 480 (1958).

41. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10
(1948). See also United States v. United States Dist. Court for the E. Dist. of Mich.,
407 U.S. 297 (1972) where the Court found that "the judgment of the magistrate that
collected evidence is sufficient to justify invasion of a citizen's private premises" is a

necessary prerequisite to the issuance of an arrest warrant. Id. at 316.

42. Stacey v. Emery, 97 U.S. 642, 645 (1878).
43. Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480 (1958); United States v. Morgan,
222 U.S. 274 (1911).
44. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
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Amendments to Rule 11(e): Plea Discussions

The amendments to rule 11(e) reflect needed changes in the procedures surrounding plea negotiations. The modifications are designed
to clarify those situations when a defendant can withdraw his guilty
plea and when evidence or testimony adverse to a defendant may be
admitted against him.
The amendment to rule I1(e)(2)' 5 clarifies the circumstances under
which a court can accept or reject a plea agreement fashioned by the
prosecution and the defense. 6 The new version attempts to eliminate
inconsistent application of the rules regarding bargained for plea
agreements."' While retaining the major provisions of the old rule, the
amended version specifies those instances when a defendant may
withdraw his plea, regardless of the treatment given by the court to the
proposed plea agreement.
Rule 1l(e)(1) provides three options from which the government's
attorney can choose in plea negotiations with the defendant. The
government can:
(A) move for a dismissal of the charges; or
(B) make a recommendation, or agree not to oppose a defendant's request, for a particular sentence, with the understanding that the recommendation or request shall not be binding on the court; or
(C) agree that a specific sentence is the appropriate disposition of the
case. 8
Ultimately, no agreement made between the prosecution and the
defense is binding on the court.' 9 Options (A) and (C) involve an affirmative act by the prosecution insofar as they require the government to
45. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(e)(2) (1979), reads as follows:
(2) Notice of Such Agreement. If a plea agreement has been reached by the
parties, the court shall, on the record, require the disclosure of the agreement in
open court or, on a showing of good cause, in camera, at the time the plea is offered. If the agreement is of the type specified in subdivision (e) (1) (A) or (C), the
court may accept or reject the agreement, or may defer its decision as to the acceptance or rejection until there has been an opportunity to consider the
presentence report. If the agreement is of the type specified in subdivision (e) (1)
(B), the court shall advise the defendant that if the court does not accept the
recommendation or request the defendant nevertheless has no right to withdraw
his plea. See note 48 and accompanying text infra for the text of rule 1l(e)(l).
(Italics indicate new material).
46. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(e)(2) (1979), Notes of the Advisory Committee. These
changes conform to the proposed amendments to FED. R. EvID. 410 which also deals
with the admissibility of plea agreements.
47. See United States v. Sarubbi, 416 F. Supp. 633 (D.N.J. 1976).
48. FED. R. CRIM. P. ll(e)(1).
49. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971).
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request a specific disposition to the court. These types of agreements
are complete when the defendant receives the contemplated charge,
dismissal or sentence. An option (B) agreement is of a different nature,
however, because the completion of that bargain is not dependent
upon ultimate acceptance or rejection by the court. Rather, the defense
prosecution bargain is satisfied in an option (B) agreement when the
prosecutor performs as agreed. The defendant's status is, at that point,
still undetermined.
The amendment to rule 1 (e)(2) specifies that the court may accept
or reject a type (A) or (C) agreement. Further, the amended version
provides that the court may defer its decision on those types of
agreements until it has had an opportunity to review presentence
reports. 0 These provisions, carried over from the former rule 11(e)(2),
require ultimate "acceptance or rejection by the court . . . so that it
may be determined whether the defendant shall receive the bargained
for concessions or shall instead be afforded an opportunity to
withdraw his plea." 5
A type (B) agreement requires no such ultimate acceptance or rejection by the court. Nonacceptance of a request for a particular
sentence does not necessarily imply a rejection of the plea agreement
itself.5 2 The defendant can still plead in accordance with his deal with
the prosecutor, and both sides can thus fulfill their part of the bargain.
In imposing a sentence other than that which is recommended or requested, the court is accepting the plea while rejecting the suggestions
of the prosecutor or the exhortations of the defendant as to a specific
sentence. I3
A type (B) plea imposes the duty upon the court to inform the
defendant that he has no right to withdraw his plea if the court does
not accept the recommendation or request for a particular sentence. 5
Thus, given a warning by the court concerning the nature of the plea
and the inability of the accused to withdraw that plea once entered, a
defendant will not be heard to complain that he was led to believe that
50.
51.

FED.
FED.

R. CRIM. P. ll(e)(2) (1979).
R. CRIM. P. ll(e)(2) (1979),

Notes of the Advisory Committee.

Withdrawal of a guilty plea is not a matter of right, and the court is not bound by any
agreement worked out between the prosecutor and a defendant. See Santobello v. New
York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971); Tucker v. United States, 470 F.2d 220 (8th Cir. 1972), cert.

denied, 412 U.S. 929 (1973). Rather, the withdrawal of a plea is at the discretion of the
court. United States v. Tabory, 462 F.2d 355 (4th Cir. 1972).
52. United States v. Sarubbi, 416 F. Supp. 633 (D.N.J. 1976).
53. See United States v. Henderson, 565 F.2d 1119 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v.
Savage, 561 F.2d 554 (4th Cir. 1977).
54. See note 45 supra. This brings the rule into conformity with the ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO PLEAS OF GUILTY, § 1.5 (Approved Draft, 1968).
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the court would definitely impose a stipulated sentence.II Further, such
a warning by the court allows the defendant the opportunity to weigh
all options before entering the plea, including the possibility of proceeding with a trial rather than agreeing to a potentially "dangerous"
deal.
This is especially necessary in cases where a defendant is faced with
several counts or charges, and the plea agreements do not fall entirely
within any of the three classifications of rule 11(e)(1). As the Advisory
Committee noted:
Sometimes a plea agreement will be partially but not entirely of the (B)
type, as where a defendant, charged with counts 1, 2, and 3, enters into
an agreement with the attorney for the government wherein it is agreed
that if the defendant pleads guilty to count 1, the prosecutor will recommend a certain sentence as to that count and will move for a dismissal of
counts 2 and 3. In such a case, the court must take particular care to ensure that the defendant understands which components of the agreement
involve only a (B) type recommendation .

. .

. If counts 2 and 3 are

dismissed and the sentence recommendation is made, then the defendant
is not entitled to withdraw his plea even if the sentence recommendation
is not accepted by the court, for the defendant received all he was entitled
to under the various components of the plea agreement.' 6
An additional amendment to rule 11(e) involves the inadmissibility
of pleas, plea discussions, and related statements made during plea
negotiations against a defendant who later withdraws a plea of guilty
or who has entered a plea of nolo contendere.1 Although its im55. United States v. Savage, 561 F.2d 554 (4th Cir. 1977); United States v. Henderson, 565 F.2d 1119 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Sarubbi, 416 F. Supp. 633 (D.N.J.
1976).
56. FED. R. CRIM. P. 1l(e)(2) (1979), Notes of the Advisory Committee.
57. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(e)(6). The amendment to subsection (e)(6), transmitted by
the Supreme Court to Congress on April 30, 1979, to become effective on August 1,
1979, was postponed by Congress via Pub. L. No. 96-42, July 31, 1979, 93 Stat. 326,
until December 1, 1980, or until approved by Congress, whichever comes first.

The amendment reads:

Except as otherwise provided in this paragraph, evidence of the following is
not, in any civil or criminal proceeding, admissible against the defendant who

made the plea or was a participant in the plea discussions:
(A) a plea of guilty which was later withdrawn;
(B) a plea of nolo contendere;

any statement made in the course of any proceeding under this rule regarding either of the foregoing pleas; or
(D) any statement made in the course of plea discussions with an attorney for
the government which do not result in a plea of guilty or which result in a
plea of guilty later withdrawn. However, such a statement is admissible (i) in
any proceeding wherein another statement made in the course of the same
plea or plea discussions has been introduced and the statement ought in fair(C)
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plementation was postponed,5" the primary purpose of the amendment
to rule I1(e)(6) is "to describe more precisely what evidence relating to
pleas or plea discussions is inadmissible." " Presumably, the rule is not
limited to statements by the defendant, but also covers statements
made by defense counsel regarding the defendant's admissions to
him.60
The amendment to rule 1 l(e)(6) is designed to promote the disposition of criminal cases through plea bargaining. "Unrestrained candor"
between the prosecution and the defense is encouraged as 11(e)(6)
specifically enumerates those instances when plea negotiations are inadmissible. 6" Thus, the prevalent view that plea bargaining discussions
must be protected so as to ensure meaningful dialogue and fruitful
negotiations is fostered. 62 For plea bargaining to work effectively, a
defendant must be free to negotiate without fear that his statements,
whether to the prosecutor or to his own attorney, will later be used
against him:
If, as the Supreme Court said in Santobello, plea bargaining is an
essential component of justice and . . . is to be encouraged, it is immediately apparent that no defendant or his counsel will pursue such an
effort if the remarks uttered during the course of it are to be admitted in
evidence as proof of guilt. Moreover, it is inherently unfair to engage in
such an activity, only to use it as a weapon against the defendant when
negotiations fail.6

The proposed version of 11(e)(6) further amends the old rule to
provide that a plea discussion statement may be admissible against a
defendant if that defendant first introduces contemporaneous
ness be considered contemporaneously with it, or (ii) in a criminal proceeding for perjury or false statement if the statement was made by the defendant under oath, on the record, and in the presence of counsel.
58. Pub. L. No. 96-42, 93 Stat. 326 (1979).
59. See Reports and Proposals,25 Crim. L. Rep. 2256 (June 13, 1979) (BNA).
60. Id. It should be noted that although no case law has been found to support this
statement, the wording of the proposed amendment, insofar as it reads "any statement
made in the course of plea discussions with an attorney for the government" supports
such an interpretation (emphasis added).
61. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(e)(6) (1979), Notes of the Advisory Committee.
62. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971) (plea bargaining as an essential
element in the administration of justice). In United States v. Herman, 544 F.2d 791
(5th Cir. 1977) the import of plea negotiations was again emphasized as the rule against
the admissibility of a defendant's plea negotiation statements was logically extended to
include statements made to postal inspectors who had no authority to conduct plea
negotiations.
63. United States v. Ross, 493 F.2d 771, 774 (5th Cir. 1979) (citing Santobello v.
New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971)). See also United States v. Smith, 525 F.2d 1017 (10th
Cir. 1975).
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statements favorable to his cause." Fairness dictates that such
statements be admissible, for if a defendant is allowed to introduce
certain statements made in plea negotiations which are favorable to
him, other relevant statements made in that negotiation session should
also be admissible." This exception to the general rule against admissibility of plea bargaining statements is predicated on the principle
that a right is waived when the holder of that right destroys the basis
for which that right is given. 6 Thus, if a defendant has the right under
rule 11 not to have certain statements admitted against him, he waives
that right by introducing portions of contemporaneous statements or
recordings. He has offset the very reason for having the right in the
first place: the elimination from evidence of negotiations working
toward a just resolution of the matter.
The amendments to rule 11(e) describe in greater detail the
ramifications and mechanics of plea agreements and discussions. A
framework is provided within which litigants can operate, because the
amendments remove some of the inconsistencies and ambiguities of the
7
former rule.
E.

Proposed New Rule 17(h): Subpoena

Proposed new subdivision (h) of rule 1768 is necessitated by the
proposed addition to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure of rule
26.2 6 which deals with the obtaining of statements of government and
defense witnesses. Proposed rule 17(h) provides that statements made
by witnesses or prospective witnesses may not be subpoenaed from-the
government or the defense; rather, the proposed rule mandates that
such statements be subject to production in accordance with the provisions of proposed rule 26.2.1 Assumedly, if rule 26.2 is enacted by
64. FED. R. CRIM. P. 1l(e)(6)(D)(i), effectiveness postponed, Pub. L. No. 96-42,
July 31, 1979, 93 Stat. 326.
65. FED. R. CRIM. P. 1l(e)(6) Notes of the Advisory Committee, effectiveness
postponed, Pub. L. No. 96-42, July 31, 1979, 93 Stat. 326. This rule is consistent with
FED. R. EvID. 106 which provides that a party may require an opponent who has introduced a portion of a writing or recorded statement to introduce any other portion
of that writing or statement which ought in fairness be considered contemporaneously
with it.

66. See id.
67. FED. R. CRIM. P. 1 (e) (1979), Notes of the Advisory Committee.
68. FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(h), effectiveness postponed, Pub. L. No. 42-46, July 31,
1979, 93 Stat. 326, reads: "(h) INFORMATION NOT SUBJECT TO SUBPOENA.
Statements made by witnesses or prospective witnesses may not be subpoenaed from
the government or the defendant under this rule, but shall be subject to production only
in accordance with the provisions of rule 26.2."
69. See note 78 and accompanying text infra.
70. FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(h), effectiveness postponed, Pub. L. No. 42-46, July 31,
1979, 93 Stat. 326.
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Congress, rule 17(h) will also become effective.' The proposed addition makes it clear that witness statements are subject to the procedural
mechanism employed by rule 26.2.
F. Amendment to Rule 18: Place of Prosecution
The amendment to rule 1872 is designed to eliminate an apparent
inconsistency73 between the former rule and the Speedy Trial Act of
1974 regarding proper venue. 7 ' Rule 18 had been interpreted by several
courts as prohibiting trial in a division other than that in which the offense was committed. 7 Itshould be noted that many districts are
divided into divisions. Section 3161(a) of the Speedy Trial Act of 1974
provides, however, that "the appropriate judicial officer . . . set the
case for trial ... at a place within the judicial district, so as to assure a
speedy trial. "76 Because the Speedy Trial Act provides that venue is
proper anywhere within the district where the alleged crime occurred,
some confusion resulted as to where venue was proper when a crime
was committed in a district with several divisions." By adding "the
prompt administration of justice" to the considerations which the
court can take into account in determining proper venue, any confusion should be alleviated. Consequently, trial can be had in any division within the appropriate district.
G. Proposed Rule 26.2: Production of Witness Statements
Perhaps the most important amendment to the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure is the proposed new rule 26.2.' The new rule pro71. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(h), Notes of the Advisory Committee, effectiveness
postponed, Pub. L. No. 42-46, July 31, 1979, 93 Stat. 326.
72. FED. R. CRIM. P. 18 (1979), reads as follows: "Except as otherwise permitted
by statute or by these rules, the prosecution shall be had in a district in which the offense was committed. The court shall fix the place of trial within the district with due
regard to the convenience and the prompt administration of justice."
73. FED. R. CRIM. P. 18 (1979), Notes of the Advisory Committee.
74. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(a) (Supp. 1980).
75. See United States v. Lewis, 504 F.2d 92 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S.
975 (1976), and Dupoint v. United States, 388 F.2d 39 (5th Cir. 1968), for a discussion
of judicial treatment of venue questions.
76. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(a) (Supp. 1980) (emphasis added).
77. See H.R. Rep. No. 93-1508, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 29 (1974), reprintedin [1974]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, 7401, 7405-06. The United States District Courts are
the trial courts within the federal system. Each state has at least one district court;
some larger states have several divisions within a single district (e.g., Northern Division
Eastern District).
78. FED. R. CRIM. P. 26.2. The enactment of Rule 26.2, transmitted by the
Supreme Court to Congress on April 30, 1979, was postponed by Congress via Pub. L.
No. 96-42, July 31, 1979, 93 Stat. 326, until December 1, 1980 or until approved by
Congress whichever comes first. The Rule reads as follows:
(a) Motion for production. After a witness other than the defendant has
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vides for the production of witness' statements to the opposing party
relative to the particular subject matter of that witness' testimony on
direct examination." The transfer of these statements is accomplished
by motion"0 and is subject to the supervision and discretion of the
court." In essence, the rule extends the principles of the Jencks Act"2
to provide for the production of defense witness' statements to the
prosecution."'
testified on direct examination, the court, on motion of a party who did not call
the witness, shall order the attorney for the government or the defendant and his
attorney, as the case may be, to produce, for the examination and use of the moving party, any statement of the witness that is in their possession and that relates
to the subject matter concerning which the witness has testified.
(b) Production of entire statement. If the entire contents of the statement
relate to the subject matter concerning which the witness has testified, the court
shall order that the statement be delivered to the moving party.
(c) Production of excised statement. If the other party claims that the statement contains matter that does not relate to the subject matter concerning which
the witness has testified, the court shall order that it be delivered to the court in
camera. Upon inspection, the court shall excise the portions of the statement that
do not relate to the subject matter concerning which the witness has testified, and
shall order that the statement, with such material excised, be delivered to the moving party. Any portion of the statement that is withheld from the defendant over
his objection shall be preserved by the attorney for the government and, in the
event of a conviction and an appeal by the defendant, shall be made available to
the appellate court for the purpose of determining the correctness of the decision
to excise the portion of the statement.
(d) Recess for examination of statement. Upon delivery of the statement to
the moving party, the court, upon application of that party, may recess proceedings in the trial for the examination of such statement and for preparation for
its use in the trial.
(e) Sanction for failure to produce statement. If the other party elects not to
comply with an order to deliver a statement to the moving party, the court shall
order that the testimony of the witness be stricken from the record and that the
trial proceed, or, if it is the attorney for the government who elects not to comply,
shall declare a mistrial if required by the interest of justice.
(f) Definition. As used in this rule, a "statement" of a witness means:
(1) a written statement made by the witness that is signed or otherwise
adopted or approved by him;
(2) a substantially verbatim recital of an oral statement made by the
witness that is recorded contemporaneously with the making of the
oral statement and that is contained in a stenographic, mechanical,
electrical, or other recording or a transcription thereof; or
(3) a statement, however taken or recorded, or a transcription thereof,
made by the witness to a grand jury.
79. FED. R. CRIM. P. 26.2(a), effectiveness postponed, Pub. L. No. 96-42, July 31,
1979, 93 Stat. 326.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 26.2 (c).
82. 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1969).
83. 18 U.S.C. § 3500(a) (1969) reads:
In any criminal prosecution brought by the United States, no statement or
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol5/iss2/7
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Proposed rule 26.2 is aimed at enhancing the search for truth
rather than confusing or stifling it.8 ' This purpose is affected by requiring the defense to produce the statements of its witnesses for use
by the government in the same manner that the government must produce statements of its witnesses as prescribed by the Jencks Act. This
results in an opportunity for both sides to compare a witness'
testimony at trial with prior statements or testimony. Thus, a witness
can be impeached by an opponent in possession of his prior inconsistent
statements. Further, the rule codifies the view that the production of
statements is a mutual obligation."

Rule 26.2 represents a codification of the rule enunciated by the
United States Supreme Court in United States v. Nobles. 6 In that
case, an investigator hired by the defense to interview prospective prose-

cution witnesses was not allowed to testify when the defense refused to
turn over portions of the investigator's report to the prosecution. The
Court concluded that "in a proper case, the prosecution can call upon
[the defense] for production of witness statements that facilitate 'full
disclosure of all [relevant] facts.' "87 Rule 26.2, in response to Nobles,
provides a framework for the development of a compulsory process
for the production of evidence needed by either the prosecution or the
defense. 8 The integrity of the judicial system, so dependent on the full
disclosure of facts and the cooperation of counsel, is protected and
enhanced. 89

Under subsection (c) of the proposed rule, disputes between the
parties as to whether the requested statement relates to the witness'
testimony are to be resolved by the court through an in camera inspect-

ion of the statement.9 Upon inspection of the statement, the court
report in the possession of the United States which was made by a Government
witness or prospective Government witness (other than the defendant) shall be the
subject of subpoena, discovery, or inspection until said witness has testified on
direct examination in the trial of the case. Id. Compare the wording of 18 U.S.C.
§ 3500(a) with FED. R. CRIM. P. 26.2, note 78 supra.
84. FED. R. CRIM. P. 26.2, Notes of the Advisory Committee, effectiveness
postponed, Pub. L. No. 46-42, July 31, 1979, 93 Stat. 326.
85. See also United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225 (1975); United States v.
Pulvirenti, 408 F. Supp. 12 (E.D. Mich. 1976); People v. Sanders, 110 11.App. 2d 85,
249 N.E. 2d 124 (1969); State v. Montague, 55 N.J. 387, 262 A.2d 398 (1970); People
v. Damon, 24 N.Y. 2d 256, 299 N.Y.S. 2d 830, 247 N.E.2d 651 (1969).
86. 422 U.S. 225 (1975). See also Goldberg v. United States, 425 U.S. 94 (1976).
87. 422 U.S. at 231 (1975) (citing United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709
(1975)).
88. 422 U.S. at 230-31.
89. Id.
90. FED. R. CRIM. P. 26.2(c), effectiveness postponed, Pub. L. No. 46-42, July 31,
1979, 93 Stat. 326.
Published by eCommons, 1980

UNIVERSITY OF DA YTON LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 5:2

may excise those portions of it that are deemed immaterial or irrelevant, or it may strike the statement in toto.9 This subsection acts as a
"safeguard against abuse and . . . enable[s] a defendant who believes
that a demand is being improperly made to secure a swift and just
resolution of the issue." 9 The excised portions of the statement,
however, are to be retained for possible review by an appellate court."
Additionally, rule 26.2 provides for sanctions in those instances
when a party refuses to comply with the ordered disclosure.", Upon
noncompliance, the court "shall order that the testimony of the
witness be stricken from the record," or, in the case of the prosecution, the court may declare a mistrial "if required by the interest of
justice."" The difference in sanctions is necessary to ensure that the
prosecution bears its burden of persuasion. Should the prosecution
refuse to turn over materials relevant to one of its witness' testimony,
the defense would bear an undue burden in attempting to impeach that
witness. 6 Presumably, the possibility of sanctions will aid in the
disclosure of relevant facts, which will ultimately lead to a fair trial,
free of surprises and inconsistencies.
H.

Amendments to Rule 32: Judgment

The 1979 changes in the Federal Rules also included several minor
changes to rule 32. Specifically, the recent modification of the rule included changes to both subsections 32(c)(3)(E)I" and 32(f):" realignment of the statutes mentioned in (c)(3)(E)" necessitated its change;
32(f) is abrogated in light of the proposed addition of 32.1.
91. Id.
92. FED. R. CRIM. P. 26.2, effectiveness postponed, Pub. L. No. 46-42, July 31,
1979, 93 Stat. 326.
93. Id.
94. FED. R. CRIM. P. 26.2(e), effectiveness postponed, Pub. L. No. 46-42, July 31,
1979, 93 Stat. 326.

95. Id.
96. See Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957). See also United States v.
Nobles, 422 U.S. 225 (1975).
97. ED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(3)(E) (1979) reads: "(E) The reports of studies and
recommendations contained therein made by the Director of the Bureau of Prisons or
the Parole Commission pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 4205(c), 4252, 5010(e), or 5037(c)
shall be considered a presentence investigation within the meaning of subdivision (c)(3)
of this rule."
98. Abrogated FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(f) read: "(f) Re ,ocation of Probation. The
court shall not revoke probation except after a hearing at which the defendant shall be
present and apprised of the grounds on which such action is proposed. The defendant
may be admitted to bail pending such hearing."
99. Former 18 U.S.C. § 4208(b) is now, in substance, 18 U.S.C. § 4205(c); former
18 U.S.C. § 5034 is now, in substance, 18 U.S.C. § 5037(c).
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Proposed Rule 32.1: Right to a Hearing Before Probation
Revocation or Modification

Proposed new rule 32.1,100 dealing with a probationer's right to a
hearing before the revocation or modification of his probation, is yet
another important change in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
0
Like other additions and amendments to the Rules,' ' proposed rule
32.1 implements changes which clarify and delineate the procedural
10 2 The
rights to be accorded an individual in a criminal proceeding.
100. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.1. The enactment of Rule 32.1, transmitted by the
Supreme Court to Congress on April 30, 1979, was postponed by Congress via Pub. L.
No. 42-46, July 31, 1979, 93 Stat. 326, until December 1, 1980 or until approved by
Congress whichever comes first. Rule 32.1 reads as follows:
(a) Revocation of Probation.
(1) Preliminary Hearing. Whenever a probationer is held in custody on the
ground that he has violated a condition of his probation, he shall be afforded a
prompt hearing before any judge, or a United States magistrate who has been
given authority pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 to conduct such hearings, in order to
determine whether there is probable cause to hold the probationer for a revocation hearing. The probationer shall be given
(A) notice of the preliminary hearing and its purpose and of the alleged
violation of probation;
(B) an opportunity to appear at the hearing and present evidence in his
own behalf;
(C) upon request, the opportunity to question witnesses against him
unless, for good cause, the federal magistrate decides that justice does not require
the appearance of the witness; and
(D) notice of his right to be represented by counsel. The proceedings shall
be recorded stenographically or by an electronic recording device. If probable
cause is found to exist, the probationer shall be held for a revocation hearing. The
probationer may be released pursuant to Rule 46(c) pending the revocation hearing. If probable cause is not found to exist, the proceedings shall be dismissed.
(2) Revocation Hearing. The revocation hearing, unless waived by the probationer, shall be held within a reasonable time in the district of probation jurisdiction. The probationer shall be given
(A) written notice of the alleged violation of probation;
(B) disclosure of the evidence against him;
(C) an opportunity to appear and to present evidence in his own behalf;
(D) the opportunity to question witnesses against him; and
(E) notice of his right to be represented by counsel.
(b) Modification of Probation. A hearing and assistance of counsel are required before the terms or conditions of probation can be modified, unless the
relief granted to the probationer upon his request or the court's own motion is
favorable to him.
101. See, e.g., the amendments and discussions on Rules 6(e) supra at subsection A
of this comment, 1l(e)(2) and (6) supra at subsection D of this comment, 41 infra at
subsection M of this comment, and 44 infra at subsection N of this comment.
102. Rule 32.1, like other changes in the Rules of Criminal Procedure, is a response
to developments in recent caselaw. Rule 32.1 formalizes the Supreme Court rulings in
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), and Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778
(1973).
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proposed rule specifies that a probationer, held for an alleged probation violation is entitled to a prompt hearing to determine if there is
probable cause for a revocation hearing. 103 Further, the probationer is
entitled to present witnesses on his own behalf, the right to counsel,
and the right to question witnesses against him. '
The genesis of the proposed rule was the Supreme Court's ruling in
Morrissey v. Brewer.'°5 In that case, the Court held a defendant arrested for a parole violation was entitled to a preliminary hearing to
determine whether there was probable cause to believe that the defendant had in fact violated his parole.' 0 In Gagnon v. Scarpelli'°7 the
Court ruled that the procedural rights granted a parolee under Morrissey should be extended to one detained for an alleged probation
violation. 0,' The Court reasoned that the revocation of probation
results in a serious deprivation of liberty, and, at the very least, entitles
the probationer to certain Constitutional safeguards.' 0 9 Consistent
with Scarpelli, subdivision (a)(l) of rule 32.1 provides for a
preliminary hearing to determine probable cause whenever the accused
is held in custody."" 0 If a probation violator is in custody there is an entitlement to a preliminary hearing;"' custody triggers the procedural
protection. Consequently, a preliminary hearing is not required when a
probationer voluntarily appears before authorities," ' or when his appearance in court is required by a show cause order." 3
In those instances when a preliminary hearing is required such
hearing must be held as soon after the probationer's detention as is
"promptly convenient.""' Thus, evidence that is still fresh in the
minds of witnesses, and that is readily available can be presented to the
103. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.1(a)(1), effectiveness postponed, Pub. L. No. 46-42, July
31, 1979, 93 Stat. 326.

104. Id. at 32.1(a)(1)(A), (B), (C), and (D).
105. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
106. Id.
107. 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
108. Id. at 781-82.
109. Id.
110. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.1 (a) (1), effectiveness postponed, Pub. L. No. 46-42, July
31, 1979, 93 Stat. 326.
111. United States v. Tucker, 524 F.2d 77 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 966
(1976).

112. United States v. Strada, 503 F.2d 1081 (8th Cir. 1974).
113. United States v. Langford, 369 F. Supp. 1107 (N.D. Ill. 1973). In Langford,
the court held that a probationer not deprived of his liberty, who was "merely required" to appear in court to show cause why his probation should not be revoked,
was not entitled to a preliminary hearing. The court found Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411
U.S. 778 (1973) inapplicable, because the show cause requirement took the place of the
preliminary hearing.
114. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 485 (1972).
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court for the probable cause determination. The preliminary hearing
requirement of the proposed rule is analogous to an arraignment in a
criminal case; the accused is informed of the charge against him and
apprised of his rights.
The hearing to which a probationer held in custody is entitled is to
determine whether there is probable cause to revoke the probationer's
freedom."' If the court finds that there is insufficient cause to detain
the probationer, he must be released. " 6 To adequately present his case,
the probationer must be given notice of the preliminary hearing, its
purpose, notice of the alleged probation violation, and notice of his
right to counsel.I' 7 The notice must be such that the probationer is apprised "of the conditions of his probation which he is alleged to have
violated," as well as the dates and events which support the charge."1
Additionally, the probationer is entitled to present evidence at the
9
hearing, and to question witnesses, if allowed by the magistrate." The
proceedings of the hearing are to be recorded.
If probable cause is found to exist, the probationer is to be held for
a revocation hearing.1 0 At the revocation hearing, which is an evaluation of all relevant facts regarding the alleged probation violation, the
probationer is again entitled to written notice of his alleged violation,
the disclosure of the evidence against him, the opportunity to appear
and present evidence on his own behalf, the opportunity to question
witnesses against him, and notice of his right to be represented by
counsel.' 2 ' Rule 32.1(a)(2) mandates that his revocation hearing be
held "within a reasonable time" of the preliminary hearing.
Revocation of a defendant's probation is proper if the court finds
that the terms of probation have been violated and that revocation appears to be warranted.' 2 2 Revocation is a matter largely within the
discretion of the court.' The evidence presented at the revocation
hearing need not be convincing "beyond a reasonable doubt" in order
115. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.1(a), effectiveness postponed, Pub. L. No. 42-46, July 31,
1979, 93 Stat. 326.
116. Id. at 32.1(a)(1).

117. Id. at 32.1(a)(1)(A) and (D).
118. Kartman v. Parratt, 397 F. Supp. 531, 534 (D. Neb. 1975), aff'd, 535 F.2d 450
(8th Cir. 1976).
119. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.1 (a)(1)(B), (C), and (D), effectiveness postponed, Pub. L.
No. 42-46, July 31, 1979, 93 Stat. 326.
120. Id. at 32.1 (a)(1).
121. Id. at 32.1(a)(2)(A), (B), (C), (D), and (E).
122. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.1, Notes of the Advisory Committee, effectiveness
postponed, Pub. L. No. 42-46, July 31, 1979, 93 Stat. 326.
123. See ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO PROBATION, § 3.3 (Approved Draft, 1970).
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to support a revocation.' 2' Rather, "[a]ll that is required is that the
evidence and facts be such as to reasonably satisfy the judge that the
conduct of the probationer has not been as good as required by the
conditions of the probation."' 25
The lack of a need for proof beyond a resonable doubt in a revocation hearing lessens the impact of rule 32.1. If, as the Supreme Court
reasoned in Morrissey'2 6 and Scarpelli,' I a parolee or probationer
must be afforded due process protection against the serious deprivation of liberty,' 28 then proof beyond a reasonable doubt should be the
standard employed in revocation proceedings. The effect of a probation revocation is the imposition of the sentence originally imposed or
a lesser sentence.' 2 9 The deprivation of liberty at this stage is no less
than it would have been had the probationer been incarcerated when
originally found guilty. Perhaps the only justification for not employing the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard is that the defendant
has already been adjudged guilty at a trial or plea proceeding. It would
seem, however, that the rights of a probationer are no less important
than those of a defendant.
Rule 32.1 further provides guidelines for modification of probation
by requiring a hearing and assistance of counsel. 3 ' Rule 32.1(b) provides an avenue for the resolution of disputes as to the meaning of ambiguous terms in a probation order' 3 ' so as to avoid a future revocation based upon a violation of that term. Additionally, when a probation officer is overworked or neglectful, or when the probation conditions are unreasonable or outdated, a probationer should have a
recourse for modification. 3"
124. United States v. Francischine, 512 F.2d 827 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
931 (1975). Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is not deemed necessary because the probationer has already had his day in court and been found guilty of the charges for
which he is now on probation. Since probation is in the discretion of the court in the
first place, there is no need for a standard which guards the defendant's rights at this
stage of the proceedings.
125. Id. at 829.
126. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
127. 411 U.S. 778 (1973).

128. See note 92 and accompanying text supra.
129. 18 U.S.C. § 3653 (1976) (Probation modification).
130. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.1(b), effectiveness postponed, Pub. L. No 42-46, July 31,
1979, 93 Stat. 326.
131. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.1(b), Notes of the Advisory Committee, effectiveness

postponed, Pub. L. No. 42-46, July 31, 1979, 93 Stat. 326.
132. Id.A sentencing court must be able to keep up with changes in the law as well
as changes in society. Further, the court is under a duty to respond to those changes.
The court must be able to respond to changes in a "probationer's circumstances as
well as new ideas and methods of rehabilitation." Id.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol5/iss2/7
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Amendment to Rule 35: Correction or Reduction of Sentence

J.

The amendment to rule 35133 confers the discretionary power upon
3
a judge to reduce a sentence from incarceration to probation.' This
addition represents a departure from prior case law.'" Formerly, a
judge was prohibited from granting such a reduction to a defendant
who had already begun serving his sentence. 13 With the amendment,
the grant of probation to one already incarcerated is considered a
"permissible reduction of sentence.' 1 37 The amendment reflects a
policy which encourages a court to "consider all alternatives that were
3
available at the time of imposition of the original sentence." 1 Thus, a
court may consider a defendant's motion to reduce an imposed
sentence in light of those sentencing options which were originally
open to it.
K. Amendment to Rule 40: Commitment to Another District
The amendment to rule 4013 involves a complete restyling of the
133. FED. R. CRIM. P. 35 (1979) reads as follows:
(a) Correction of sentence. The court may correct an illegal sentence at any
time and may correct a sentence imposed in an illegal manner within the time provided herein for the reduction of sentence.
(b) Reduction of sentence. The court may reduce a sentence within 120 days
after the sentence is imposed, or within 120 days after receipt by the court of a
mandate issued upon affirmance of the judgment or dismissal of the appeal, or
within 120 days after entry of any order or judgment of the Supreme Court denying review of, or having the effect of upholding, a judgment of conviction. The
court may also reduce a sentence upon revocation of probation as provided by
law. Changing a sentence from a sentence of incarceration to a grant of probation
shall constitute a permissible reduction of sentence under this subdivision.
134. FED. R. CRIM. P. 35 (1979), Notes of the Advisory Committee.
135. In both Affronti v. United States, 350 U.S. 79 (1955), and United States v.
Murray, 275 U.S. 347 (1928), the Supreme Court, in construing the Probation Act, 18
U.S.C. § 3651, found that a judge could not grant probation to a convict who had
already begun serving time in the penitentiary.
136. Id.
137. FED. R. CRIM. P. 35(b) (1979).

138. United States v. Golphin, 362 F. Supp. 698, 699 (W.D. Pa. 1973). See also
R. CRIM. P. 35(b) (1979), Notes of the Advisory Committee.
139. FED. R. CRIM. P. 40 (1979) reads as follows:
(a) Appearance Before Federal Magistrate.-If a person is arrested in a
district other than that in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, he
shall be taken without unnecessary delay before the nearest available federal
magistrate. Preliminary proceedings concerning the defendant shall be conducted
in accordance with Rules 5 and 5.1, except that if no preliminary examination is
held because an indictment has been returned or an information filed or because
the defendant elects to have the preliminary examination conducted in the district
in which the prosecution is pending, the person shall be held to answer upon a
finding that he is the person named in the indictment, information or warrant. If
the defendant is held to answer, he shall be held to answer in the district court in

FED.
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prior rule. There is a substantial change in the procedure accorded
those arrested in districts different from that of the crime. The distinction between arrest in a nearby district and one in a distant district is
abolished. The new rule adds provisions not found in the former rule,
dealing with the arrest of probationers in districts other than the
district of supervision. It also clarifies the bailsetting procedure and
provides a postarrest procedure for persons who failed to appear in

other districts. 140
In eliminating the distinction between arrests in nearby and distant
districts, amended rule 40 provides for a uniform preliminary hearing
procedure whenever an accused is arrested outside the district where
which the prosecution is pending, provided that a warrant is issued in that district
if the arrest was made without a warrant, upon production of the warrant or a
certified copy thereof.
(b) Statement by Federal Magistrate.-In addition to the statements required
by Rule 5, the federal magistrate shall inform the defendant of the provisions of
Rule 20.
(c) Papers.-If a defendant is held or discharged, the papers in the proceeding
and any bail taken shall be transmitted to the clerk of the district court in which
the prosecution is pending.
(d) Arrest of Probationer.-If a person is arrested for a violation of his probation in a district other than the district of supervision, he shall be taken without
unnecessary delay before the nearest available federal magistrate. The federal
magistrate shall:
(1) Proceed if jurisdiction over the probationer is transferred to that
district pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3653;
(2) Hold a prompt preliminary hearing if the alleged violation occurred in
that district, and either (i) hold the probationer to answer in the district court of
the district having probation supervision or (ii) dismiss the proceedings and so
notify that court; or
(3) Otherwise order the probationer held to answer in the district court of
the district having probation jurisdiction upon production of certified copies of
the probation order, the warrant, and the application for the warrant, and upon a
finding that the person before him is the person named in the warrant.
(e) Arrest for Failure to Appear.-If a person is arrested on a warrant in a
district other than that in which the warrant was issued, and the warrant was
issued because of the failure of the person named therein to appear as required
pursuant to a subpoena or the terms of his release, the person arrested shall be
taken without unnecessary delay before the nearest available federal magistrate.
Upon production of the warrant or a certified copy thereof and upon a finding
that the person before him is the person named in the warrant, the federal
magistrate shall hold the person to answer in the district in which the warrant was
issued.
(f) Bail.-If bail was previously fixed in another district where a warrant, information or indictment issued, the federal magistrate shall take into account the
amount of bail previously fixed and the reasons set forth therefor, if any, but will
not be bound by the amount of bail previously fixed. If the federal magistrate
fixes bail different from that previously fixed, he shall set forth the reasons for his
action in writing.
140. FED. R. CRIM. P. 40(a), (d), (e), and (f) (1979).
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the warrant was issued or the alleged offense committed. Under the old
rule, one arrested in a nearby district' 1 on the basis of a warrant issued
or offense committed in another district was entitled to proceedings
under rules 5 and 5.1.142 Rules 5 and 5.1 provide for a preliminary
determination of probable cause that an offense was committed and
that it was committed by the arrestee. One arrested in a distant
district, ' 3 however, was only entitled to a hearing before a magistrate
to determine if there was sufficient evidence to order the defendant's
removal to the district in which the arrest warrant was issued or the offense committed. The enactment of a uniform procedure will adequately "protect the [due process] rights of an arrestee wherever he
might be arrested,"' 14 because the probable cause determination must
now be made no matter where the defendant or probationer is apprehended. The rule retains the requirement that a warrant must be
issued by the district in which the alleged offense took place if the accused was arrested without a warrant. This guarantees that the district
of anticipated prosecution will have made a determination of probable
cause.

141

A new provision of rule 40 is subsection (d) which deals with the
arrest of probationers in districts other than the district of supervision.
Under this subsection, the probationer, when arrested in a district
other than the one having supervision of his probation, can be returned
to the supervisory district or retained in the arresting district upon a
proper transfer of jurisdiction. 1 6 Practically, such a transfer of
jurisdiction to the arresting district would be especially appropriate if
the accused/probationer was residing in the transferee district. Con141. Nearby district is defined as a different district in the same state, or a district in
a different state, but less than one hundred miles from the place of arrest. FED. R.
CRIM. P. 40, abrogated, August 1, 1979.
142. FED. R. CRIM. P. 40 (1979), Notes of the Advisory Committee.
143. Distant district is defined as a place in a different state which is over one hundred miles from the place of arrest. FED. R. CRIM. P. 40, amended by Pub. L. No.
42-46, July 31, 1979, 93 Stat. 326.
144. FED. R. CRIM. P. 40 (1979), Notes of the Advisory Committee.
145. Id.
146. 18 U.S.C. § 3653 (1976) provides in pertinent part that:
Whenever during the period of his probation, a probationer heretofore or
hereafter placed on probation, goes from the district in which he is being supervised
to another district, jurisdiction over him may be transferred, in the discretion of
the court, from the court for the district from which he goes to the court for the
other district, with the concurrence of the latter court. Thereupon the court for
the district to which jurisdiction is transferred shall have all power with respect to
the probationer that was previously possessed by the court for the district from
which the transfer is made, except that the period of probation shall not be changed
without the consent of the sentencing court.
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siderable expense and loss of time can be saved by transferring
jurisdiction over the probationer rather than transferring him back to
the supervisory district. '47 However, when the probationer is arrested
in the same district in which the alleged probation violation occurred,
he is entitled to a prompt preliminary hearing.'4 8 Should proposed rule
32.1 be adopted, then presumably, the hearing would be conducted in
accordance with the procedure set forth therein. If, however, the alleged
probation violation took place in a district other than the one in which
the probationer is arrested, there is no requirement for a preliminary
hearing.' ' 9 The arresting district is required to hold the probationer to
answer in the district having supervisory jurisdiction. The court will
hold the probationer for production of the probation order, the warrant, the application for the warrant, and for a finding that the person
before the court is the person named in the warrant.' 50 The probationer will not be held to answer in the supervisory district until a warrant is issued for him and produced to the arresting
district-procedural rights are thereby safeguarded.'
Subdivision (e) of rule 40, which has no counterpart in the former
rule, deals with the arrest of persons who have escaped or otherwise
failed to appear pursuant to subpoena in a district other than the one
which issued the warrant. A defendant who is a fugitive from justice is
not entitled to a preliminary hearing as provided for in subsection (a)
of the rule.' 5 2 Upon production of the warrant and a determination as
to proper identity, the accused will be held to answer in the district in
which the warrant was issued. For the purpose of returning a prisoner
who has escaped from custody, the court may summarily direct his
return under its general power to issue writs.' 3
A further modification of rule 40, set forth in subsection (f), allows
a federal magistrate to fix the bail of an arrestee at an amount dif147. FED. R. CRIM. P. 40 (1979), Notes of the Advisory Committee.
148. See notes 100-132 and accompanying text supra for a discussion of Rule 32.1.
149. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 40(d) (1979). See also FED. R. CRIM. P. 40(d)(3) (1979),
Notes of the Advisory Committee.
150. Id.
151. See notes 86-100 and accompnaying text supra.
152. Note the Eighth Circuit's treatment of this issue in Bandy v. United States, 408
F.2d 518 (8th Cir. 1969). This case involved a defendant released on his own
recognizance, but who failed to appear at a court ordered hearing. He objected to his
arrest in New York and subsequent removal to Kansas which was not in compliance
with Rule 40 procedures. The court held that "the provisions of Rules 5 and 40...
may not be availed of by a prisoner in escape status." Id. at 521 (quoting Rush v.
United States, 290 F.2d 709, 710 (5th Cir. 1961)).
153. Notzoff, Removal of Defendants in Federal Criminal Proceedings, 4 F.R.D.
455 (1945).
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ferent from that previously set in another district.'" The magistrate is
to take into account the previous bail amount, but is not bound by
it.'" Any changes in bail made by the magistrate must be accompanied
by a written explanation."' By allowing the magistrate greater discretion, the individual circumstances of a particular defendant can now
be given greater consideration.
The various changes in rule 40 have affected a complete restyling
of that rule.
L.

Rule 41: Search and Seizure

The 1979 amendment to subsection (b) of rule 41 authorizes the issuance of a warrant to search for persons who may be unlawfully
restrained or who may be suspects in the commission of a crime.'"
There is no counterpart in old rule 41, which was directed only to the
search and seizure of certain kinds of property and contraband. This
amendment prescribes a procedure for procuring a search warrant to
search for a person on private premises. It is a well settled principle of
law that law enforcement officers "may not constitutionally enter the
home of a private individual to search for another person, though he
be named in a valid arrest warrant ... absent probable cause that the
named suspect is present within at the time."' 5 8 However, there is a
split among the circuits as to whether a search warrant is necessary to
enter private premises to effectuate an arrest.'
Some courts have
154.

FED. R. CRIM. P. 40(f) (1979).
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41 (1979) reads in part:
(b) Property or Persons Which May Be Seized with a Warrant.-A warrant
may be issued under this rule to search for and seize any (1) property that constitutes evidence of the commission of a criminal offense; or (2) contraband, the
fruits of crime, or things otherwise criminally possessed; or (3) property designed
or intended for use or which is or has been used as the means of committing a
criminal offense; or (4) person for whose arrest there is probable cause, or who is
unlawfully restrained.
158. Fisher v. Volz, 496 F.2d 333, 338 (3d Cir. 1974). Accord, Chambers v.
Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
159. Compare United States v. Fernandez, 480 F.2d 726 (2d Cir. 1973), With Virgin
Islands v. Gereau, 502 F.2d 914 (3d. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 909 (1975). In
the former case, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals found that no search warrant
was necessary where the police had probable cause to believe that a suspect was hiding
in the home of a third person; they found that a valid arrest was made in that case. In
the latter case, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals found that absent exigent circumstances an arrest warrant could not be substituted for a search warrant. But see
Payton v. New York, 48 U.S.L.W. 4375 (1980) where the Court held that the Fourth
Amendment prohibits the police from making a warrantless and nonconsensual entry
into a suspect's home in order to make a routine felony arrest.
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maintained that probable cause that a suspect is within the home of a
third person is itself sufficient to validate an arrest entry. I" Conversely,
other courts have asserted that in the absence of exigent circumstances,
a search warrant is a necessary prerequisite to the effectuation of such
a valid arrest. 16' There is a body of authority which now holds that an
arrest warrant is insufficient to justify police entry into the home of a
third person to search for suspects named in an arrest warrant. 16 The
logic of this position is that an arrest warrant indicates only that the
police officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect has committed the crime; it affords no probable cause for believing that the
suspect is located in a third person's home.' 6 3 Recognizing that some
courts are moving towards a requirement that police obtain a search
warrant for such arrests, rule 41 provides police with the opportunity
to obtain the necessary warrants.
In adddition to making a search warrant available to seize those
persons in third party premises for whom there is probable cause to arrest, the amendment provides for search warrants to be issued to
search for a person who is being held against their will.' 6 4 Persons
unlawfully restrained are "evidence" of a crime, and therefore properly
the subject of a search warrant.' 65 The availability of a search warrant
provides for an initial neutral probable cause determination.
M.

Proposed Amendment to Rule 44: Joint Representation

The final amendment to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
proposed by the Supreme Court on April 30, 1979, is the addition of
subsection (c) to rule 44. 166 Rule 44(c), as proposed, provides that
160. United States v. Fernandez, 480 F.2d 726 (2d Cir. 1973); United States ex rel.
Wright v. Woods, 432 F.2d 1143 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 966 (1971).
161. United States v. Calhoun, 542 F.2d 1094 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1064 (1977).
162. See, e.g., Virgin Islands v. Gereau, 502 F.2d 914 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
420 U.S. 909 (1975). But see note 159 supra.
163. Fisher v. Volz, 496 F.2d 333, 341 (3d Cir. 1974).
164. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b)(4) (1979).
165. ALI MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 210.3(1)(d) (Proposed

Official Draft Complete Text and Commentary, 1975).
166. FED. R. CRIM. P. 44(c), effectiveness postponed, Pub. L. No. 42-46, July 31,

1979, 93 Stat. 326 until December 1, 1980 or at such time when Congress approves the
addition, which ever comes first. Rule 44(c) reads:
Joint Representation. Whenever two or more defendants have been jointly
charged pursant to Rule 8(b) or have been joined for trial pursuant to Rule 13,
and are represented by the same retained or assigned counsel or by retained or
assigned counsel who are associated in the practice of law, the court shall promptly
inquire with respect to such joint representation and shall personally advise each
defendant of his right to the effective assistance of counsel, including separate
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whenever two or more defendants are jointly charged under rule 8 6 or
joined for trial under rule 13, '16 and are represented by the same
counsel or by counsel who are associated in the practice of law, the
court is to personally advise each defendant of his right to effective
assistance of counsel including separate representation. The rule thus
"establishes a procedure for avoiding the occurence of events which
might otherwise give rise to a plausible postconviction claim that
because of joint representation the defendants . . .were deprived of
69
their Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel."
The potential problems arising from dual representation are legion;
preventing and minimizing these problems are the laudable goals to
which rule 44(c) is directed. One difficulty which may arise in the
course of trial is a conflict of interest between codefendants if either of
them plans to take the stand. "' Thus, an attorney representing both
codefendants may be precluded from giving full and effective
assistance of counsel to both of his clients." Problems may also be encountered in pretrial situations. Codefendants may be hampered in
plea bargaining attempts, as one defendant might be tempted to plead
guilty to a lesser charge in exchange for testimony against the other,
resulting in pressure on the second defendant to plead guilty rather
than facing his codefendant's testimony at trial.'
Under a rule 44(c) inquiry, the court must address each defendant
personally, and advise him of the potential dangers and conflicts of interest which may arise from dual representation. " It is the court's duty
to ensure that both defendants understand the risks of dual representation and that they realize that they have a right to separate counsel. '4
The court's inquiry is beneficial for both the defendant and the prorepresentation. Unless it appears that there is good cause to believe no conflict of
interest is likely to arise, the court shall take such measures as may be appropriate
to protect each defendant's right to counsel.
167. FED. R. CRIM. P. 8(b) provides that two or more defendants may be jointly
charged if they have participated in the same act or transaction constituting the offense
with which they are charged.
168. FED. R. CRIM. P. 13 provides that the court may order two or more indictments
or informations to be tried together if the offenses and defendants could have been
joined in a single indictment or information.
169. FED. R. CRIM. P. 44(c), Notes of the Advisory Committee, effectiveness
postponed, Pub. L. No. 42-46, July 31, 1979, 93 Stat. 326.
170. Morgan v. United States, 396 F.2d 110 (2d Cir. 1968).
171. United States v. Carrigan, 543 F.2d 1053 (2d Cir. 1976).
172. United States v. Mari, 526 F.2d 117 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 941
(1976).
173. See United States v. Garcia, 517 F.2d 272, 278 (5th Cir. 1975).
174. See United States v. Foster, 469 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1972).
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secution, as it provides for early identification of potential conflicts
before prejudicial error occurs.'
III.

CONCLUSION

The recent amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure make a number of significant changes. 7" The amendments are
generally corrective and conform the criminal rules to recent court
decisions and other changes in the law. The modifications and additions to the rules seek to establish a balance in their application so that
both the prosecution and the defense share in their benefits and
burdens. The requirement that all grand jury proceedings be recorded,
the provisions dealing with disclosure of prior statements made by
either party's witness, and the detailing of a procedure for probation
revocation hearings demonstrate a concern that the Rules genuinely
provide for the prompt, efficient, and fair administration of justice.
The amendments will undoubtedly bring that goal closer to reality.
William C. Becker, Jr.
Richard A. Sheils, Jr.
175. United States v. Garcia, 517 F.2d 272 (5th Cir. 1975). See also United States v.
Mar, 526 F.2d 117 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 941 (1976); United States v.
DeBerry, 487 F.2d 448 (2d Cir. 1973). In Mari the defendant was informed by the
court of the possible conflicts involved in joint representation, but the defendant
nonetheless plead guilty to the charges against him. On appeal, the court would not
hear the defendant complain of the representation he received. See also United States
ex rel Hart v. Davenport, 478 F.2d 203 (3d Cir. 1973); United States v. Foster, 469
F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1972).
176. 125 CONG. REc. H 6735-36 (daily ed. July 23, 1979) (remarks of Rep. Drinan).
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